



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *180421/01*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 1119 (AFGHANISTAN)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 11 April 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 1119**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

ISN 1119  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 10



3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

(U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB.

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1)



(b) (U) Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded the HIG as a faction of the Hezb-I-Islami party in 1977. It was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets and has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and sent mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered shelter to bin Laden after he fled Sudan in 1996. The HIG staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state. (DMO-4)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(1)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1)



ISN 1119  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 10

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(b)(1),(b)(5)



ISN 1119  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 10

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(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 1119  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 7 of 10



(b)(1),(b)(5)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1)



5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Afghanistan. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

(b)(2)



7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



ISN 1119  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 9 of 10

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)



d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)



**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)



ISN 1119  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 10 of 10



**Department of Defense**  
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**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *4/9/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 115 (YEMEN)**

o Subject ARB was held on 08 Mar 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5)

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

*DE 8-21*

(b)(5)

Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 115**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive and refused to attend the interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that, in accordance with Standard Operating Procedures, the Joint Detention Group (JDG) liaison hand-carried two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, to the JDG point of contact for delivery to the EC. The ARB also confirmed that the AMO received verbal confirmation from the JDG liaison of said delivery to the EC.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 115  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 7



b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(7)(A)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(D)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)




ISN 115  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 7

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



ISN 115  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 7

(b)(1), (b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

5. (U) **Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) **Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U)

(b)(2)



7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC *15 2/20/08*

**SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 1165 (AFGHANISTAN)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 19 Oct 07 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)
- 
- 
- 
- 

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) (Transfer with conditions)

(b)(5) Detain \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

**Attachments:**

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 1165**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC chose to attend, and consequently the Board convened with the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC wanted to appear personally in the ARB Proceedings and respond to each statement of information in the Unclassified Summary after its presentation.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The EC responded verbally to each allegation/statement in the Unclassified Summary. The EC answered a series of questions from the ARB, which included inquiries regarding his ties to extremists, involvement in planning of operations against U.S. and Coalition Forces and his plans for the future if released. All EC testimony and comments are included in enclosure (4).

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

ISN 1165  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 8

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(5)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(5)

**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(1)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(5)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)





(b)(1)



(i) (U) Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin is a Terrorist Organization founded by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as a faction of the Hezb-e-Islami party in 1977. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hekmatyar ran several training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hekmatyar offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after he fled Sudan in 1996. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan. (DMO-4)

(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(D)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(D)



ISN 1165  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 6 of 8



**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Afghanistan. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level**. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value**. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1), (b)(5)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

8. ~~(S//NF)~~ EC Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

9. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3), 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

ISN 1165  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 8 of 8

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
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**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *8/14/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 117 (YEMEN)**

○ Subject ARB was held on 16 May 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5)  
(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

○ Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

○ Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

○ The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer with Conditions \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 117**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 117  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 117  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 3 of 8

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 117  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 8

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 117  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 8

(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b)(5)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

ISN 117  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 7 of 8

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Recommendation**

(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *JS 10/25*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 128 (YEMEN)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 23 Aug 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCC

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASIA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 128**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B. The detainee's interview was scheduled for 17 August; however, upon learning the purpose of the meeting, the detainee refused to leave his cell. In accordance with Standard Operating Procedures, the Joint Detention Group (JDG) liaison hand-carried two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, to the JDG point of contact for delivery to the detainee. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery to the detainee from the JDG.

(b)(1)

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 128  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8



b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)





e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)

i (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level**. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value**. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- c. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Detainee Treatment Act Consideration**. (b)(5)

- d. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Recommendation**. (b)(5)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)

ISN 128  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 8 of 8

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *8/4/13/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 131 (YEMEN)**

o Subject ARB was held on 22 March 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5)

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 131**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview. These comments are documented in Exhibit EC-B.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 131  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(7)(A)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(1)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~


(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 131  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 8

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. **(U) Organizational Affiliations**

(b)(1)



f. **(U) Individual Affiliations**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)





g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)



(b)(5)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3): 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *15/12/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 1452 (ALGERIA)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 24 Sep 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

*[Signature]*  
*12-12*

Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 1452**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.
- b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (7):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

ISN 1452  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 2 of 13

(b)(1), (b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(5)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(7)(A)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 1452  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 3 of 13

(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 1452  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 4 of 13



(b)(1)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)



(a) (U) According to the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, Al-Jihad also known as the Egyptian Jihad Group is an Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970s. It merged with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. The

ISN 1452  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 5 of 13

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack the U.S. and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.

(DMO-4)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(a) (U) According to the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hekmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in

ISN 1452  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 6 of 13

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghani Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state. (DMO-4)

(b)(1)



(a) (U) According to the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, the Hizb ul-Mujahedin is the largest Kashmiri militant group, was founded in 1989 and officially supports the liberation of Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan, although some cadres are pro-independence. The group is the militant wing of Pakistan's largest Islamic political party, the Jamaat-i-islami. It currently is focused on Indian security forces and politicians in Kashmir and has conducted operations jointly with other Kashmiri militants. It reportedly operated in Afghanistan through the mid-1990s and trained along side the Afghani Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin in Afghanistan until the Taliban takeover. (DMO-4)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 1452  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 8 of 13



(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



h. **(U) Other Information**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 1452  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 9 of 13



(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 1452  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 10 of 13

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(D)



**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Algeria. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material submitted on behalf of ISN 1452, herein enclosed as Enclosure (4). There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 1452.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)




ISN 1452  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 11 of 13

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board


a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1), (b)(5)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)



ISN 1452  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 12 of 13

(b)(1),(b)(5)



d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)



**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)







**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC *11/10/08*

**SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 1453 (YEMEN)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 29 November 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	(b)(5)
FBI	(b)(5)

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) (Detain)

(b)(5) Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 1453**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC refused to attend the interview. The Joint Detention Group (JDG) liaison hand-carried two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, to the JDG point of contact for delivery to the EC. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery to the EC from the JDG.

(b)(1), (b)(5)

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 1453  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 11

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

4. (U) **Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

ISN 1453  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 2 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 1453  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 3 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)





(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)





~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 1453  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 6 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

- a. The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

(b)(2)



7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)





(b)(1)



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration: (b)(5)



(b)(1)





~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation (b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

ISN 1453  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 11 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC

**SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 1456 (YEMEN)**

- Subject ARB was held on 23 November 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**Attachments:**

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 1456**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 1456  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 10

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1)



ISN 1456  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 3 of 10

(b)(1)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1)



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 1456  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1), (b)(5)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)



(a) (U) \* CNN reported Kamal Derwish was identified as the lead recruiter of six Yemeni-Americans from a small city five miles from Buffalo, New York who went to al Qaida military training camps in the summer of 2001. Derwish was killed in November 2002 by a CIA-launched Predator missile attack on al Qaida operatives in Yemen. (DMO-3)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)



5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Saudi Arabia. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

(b)(2)



7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a  due to the following factors:

ISN 1456  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 8 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1)



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 1456  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 9 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1)



d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)



**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)



ISN 1456  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 10 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *18/28/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 1457 (YEMEN)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 23 November 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	(b)(5)
FBI	(b)(5)

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 1457**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 1457  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 10

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(7)(A)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(7)(A)





~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 1457  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 1457  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)



(a) (U) \* According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an extremist group active since the late 1970s. DHS assessed the group merged with UBL's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. DHS reported the primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack United States and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad. (DMO-2)

(b) (U) \* The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reported the Egyptian Islamic Jihad is identified in Executive Order 13224. OFAC further reported Executive Order 13224 was created to block property and prohibit transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism. (DMO-3)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(7)(A)



(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)



ISN 1457  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 7 of 10



(b)(1)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)



(b)(1), (b)(5)



d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC  
§ 130b, (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *162/1/08*

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
ICO ISN 1458 (ETHIOPIA)

- o Subject ARB was held on 18 Jan 2008 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to [REDACTED] based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: [REDACTED]
- Intelligence Value: [REDACTED]
- Other Factors: [REDACTED]

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

[REDACTED]

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Detain) *[Signature]*

[REDACTED]

Transfer

Release *2-22-08*

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 1458**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) Exhibit EC-A, Notification of CSRT Determination, dated 7 January 2008, constitutes constructive notice of Enemy Combatant Notification of ISN 1458, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO hand-delivered two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, to the EC.

d.(U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

ISN 1458  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 11

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b) (U) The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is a designated foreign terrorist organization with ties to other North African extremists sympathetic to al Qaida. (DMO-2)

(b)(1)



(a) (U) Jamat-al-Tabligh has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups under the cover of religious activities. (DMO-19)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1)



ISN 1458  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 3 of 11

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)





(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(a) (U) Jose Padilla (ISN 10008) was found guilty of terrorism conspiracy charges in the United States. (DMO-3)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 1458  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 1458  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 7 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)



(a) (U) The Jamat-al-Tabligh organization is closely aligned with Pakistani terrorist organizations and al Qaida. (DMO-19)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)





g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)



5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Ethiopia. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

(b)(2)



ISN 1458  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 9 of 11

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a [REDACTED] due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of [REDACTED] due to the following factors:

(b)(1), (b)(5)

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

[REDACTED]


(b)(1)



(g) ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)



**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision. (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)
- 

ISN 1458  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 11 of 11



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC *2/3/08*

**SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 1460 (PAKISTAN)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 27 December 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	(b)(5)
FBI	(b)(5)

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5) (Detain) *2-14*  
(b) Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

**Attachments:**

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 1460**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

(b)(1), (b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 1460  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 9

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

ISN 1460  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 2 of 9

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1)



**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(1)



ISN 1460  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 3 of 9

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



**SECRET//NOFORN**

(b)(1)



ISN 1460  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 4 of 9

**SECRET//NOFORN**



(b)(1)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(5)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 1460  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 5 of 9

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1)



**g. (U) Behavior**

(b)(5)



**h. (U) Other Information**

(b)(1)



**i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 1460  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 6 of 9

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Pakistan. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material submitted on behalf of ISN 1460, identified herein as enclosure (4). There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 1460.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a <sup>(b)(7)(D)</sup> due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of <sup>(b)(7)(D)</sup> due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

ISN 1460  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 7 of 9

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



(b)(1)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

(b)(5)



(b)(5)



(b)(1)



d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)



ISN 1460  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 9 of 9

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC *AG 7/12/08*

**SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 1461 (PAKISTAN)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 11 Jan 2008 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	(b)(5)
FBI	(b)(5)

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5) (Detain) *[Signature]*

(b)(5) Transfer 2-22-08 Release 08

**Attachments:**

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 1461**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC wanted to appear personally in the ARB Proceedings and wanted the assistance of the AMO. However, just prior to being brought to the Board, the EC refused to attend and consequently the board convened without the EC present.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 1461  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 1 of 12



b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (7):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for EC Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(5)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(5)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1)



**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 1461  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 4 of 12

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 1461  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 5 of 12

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 1461  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 6 of 12



(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1)



**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Pakistan. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material presented on behalf of ISN 1461, herein enclosed as Enclosure (4), Exhibit EC-D. There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 1461.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)



**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



ISN 1461  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 8 of 12

(b)(1)



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1)



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)



ISN 1461  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 10 of 12

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 1461  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 11 of 12

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~


~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)



**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision. (b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)



ISN 1461  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 12 of 12

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *AS 12/11/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 1463 (YEMEN)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 18 August 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)
- 
- 
- 
- 

(b)(1)

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

*[Signature]*  
*12-19*

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 1463**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC chose to attend, and consequently the Board convened with the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC wanted to appear personally in the ARB Proceedings and wanted to respond to each statement of information in the Unclassified Summary after its presentation.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.



**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(5)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(1)

c. (U) Training

(b)(5)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1)

(b)(1)



(a) (U) According to the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an extremist group that has been active since the late 1970s. Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. The primary goals of Egyptian Islamic Jihad are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state, and to attack U.S. and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad. (DMO-4)

(b)(1)



(a) (U) According to the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, Ansar al Islam is a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs who have vowed to establish an independent Islamic state in northern Iraq. It was formed in September 2001 and is closely allied with al Qaida. Its members trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and now provide safe haven to al Qaida fighters fleeing Afghanistan. The group receives funding, training, equipment, and combat support from al Qaida. (DMO-4)

(b)(1)



(b)(5)



(b)(1)



ISN 1463  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 5 of 10



(b)(1)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



(i) (U) According to the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, the Tunisian Combatant Group is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets U.S. and Western interests. The loosely organized group has come to be associated with al Qaida and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots. (DMO-4)

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(5)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1)



(b)(1)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level**. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value**. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- c. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Detainee Treatment Act Consideration**. (b)(5)  
(b)(5)



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

ISN 1463  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 10 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *189/19/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 148 (TUNISIA)**

o Subject ARB was held on 16 May 2007

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Transfer with conditions)

(b)(5)

Detain \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 148**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

ISN 148  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. No new exhibits were introduced since last year's ARB:

**a. (U) Background**

(b)(1)

**b. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1)

ISN 148  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 3 of 8

(b)(1)



c. (U) Travel

(b)(1)



d. (U) Training

(b)(1)



e. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



f. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



g. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 148  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 8

(b)(1)

h. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

i. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

(b)(5)



j. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Tunisia. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3): 10 USC  
§ 130b, (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *15/8/5*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 152 (YEMEN)**

○ Subject ARB was held on 15 May 2007

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

○ Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

- 
- 
- 

○ Agency assessments follow:

(b)(5)

DASD-DA

CIA

FBI

○ The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Transfer with Conditions)

(b)(5)

Detain \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 152**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

ISN 152  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 9



(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the

ISN 152  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 2 of 9

following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB.

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 152  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 3 of 9

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 152  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 9



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1)

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation (b)(5)

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)







**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *10/30/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 153 (YEMEN)**

o Subject ARB was held on 14 Sep 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 153**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive. A copy of both the English and Arabic translated Unclassified Summary of Evidence, was provided to the detainee according to Joint Detention Group Standard Operating Procedures.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC appeared to understand the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 153  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 7

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(1) (U) The Board noted that there was no recruitment information found for this EC.

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1)



**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(1)





(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(1) (U) The Board notes there was no substantive or collaborative information on organizational affiliations for this EC.

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

ISN 153  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 7

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

5. (U) **Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) **Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) **Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level**. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

ISN 153  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 7

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

## 8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *18 3/31/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 156 (YEMEN)**

(b)(5)

o Subject ARB was held on 20 February 2007 and resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCC

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 156**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC wanted the assistance of the AMO but affirmatively declined to personally appear in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview and provided an oral statement made by the EC to the AMO during the interview. The comments and oral statement are documented in Exhibit EC-B. The AMO further presented correspondence from the EC as Exhibit EC-C, identified herein as enclosure (4).

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

(b)(5)



f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the

ISN 156  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 7

ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

ISN 156  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 2 of 7

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)



Board Note:

(b)(1)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

#### 8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

ISN 156  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 7 of 7

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *AS 5/2/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 163 (YEMEN)**

(b)(5)

o Subject ARB was held on 04 April 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

(b)(5)

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 163**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive. The AMO informed the board that the EC refused to meet for an interview. The AMO confirmed the EC received a translated copy of the Unclassified Summary.

d. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

(U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

ISN 163  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. No new exhibits were introduced since last year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1)



**b. (U) Travel** (The EC traveled to locations known to be used by al Qaida or the Taliban. The following account based on the EC's statements lacks details, is inconsistent, and is in places hard to believe.)

(b)(1)





(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

e.(U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 163  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 8

**g. (U) Behavior**

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

**h. (U) Other Information**

(b)(1)

**i. (U) Factors in Support of**

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

(b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of

(b)(5)

due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation

(b)(5)

#### 8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)

ISN 163  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 8 of 8

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC *15 3/12/08*

**SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 168 (TUNISIA)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 15 January 2008 resulting in a unanimous recommendation (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)	
(b)(5) (Transfer)	<i>[Signature]</i>
(b)(5) Detain	3-17 Release

**Attachments:**

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR  
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 168**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, were delivered to the Joint Detention Group (JDG) point of contact for delivery to the EC. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery to the EC from the JDG.

(b)(1), (b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 168  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 12

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)



(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)



(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



ISN 168  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 2 of 12



(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(1)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 168  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 4 of 12

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(D)



(ii) (U) \* According to an Open Source report, Amor Sliti was sentenced to five years for recruiting Muslims for terrorist training in Afghanistan. (DMO-4)

ISN 168  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 5 of 12

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(D)



(a) (U) \* An Arabic London newspaper reported ISN 10016 was a Palestinian fundamentalist in charge of Usama bin Laden's camps. ISN 10016 decided who was to be accepted and who was to be rejected. ISN 10016 was in charge of the financial expenses of the camps. ISN10016 was also in charge of making the travel arrangements of the brothers who were either going to the camps or returning to their countries of origin. (DMO-3)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(D)





(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(D)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

ISN 168  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 7 of 12

(b)(1)



(a) (U) \* According to a Department of Homeland Security report, the TCG is identified as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and is reportedly seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia, and targets U.S. and Western interests. The group has come to be associated with al Qaida and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots during the past two years. (DMO-2)

(b)(1)



(a) (U) \* According to a Department of Homeland Security report, the GIA is an Islamic extremist group. The GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The group conducts frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. Since 1992, the group has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. (DMO-2)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)



ISN 168  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 8 of 12

(b)(1),(b)(7)(D)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(1),(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Tunisia. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (b)(2)
- 

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses (b)(5) due to the following factors:
- 

ISN 168  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 10 of 12



(b)(1)



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1)



(b)(5)



ISN 168  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 11 of 12

(b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(D)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

e. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3), 10 USC  
§ 130b, (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC 6/28/07

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
ICO ISN 170 (YEMEN)

o Subject ARB was held on 3 May 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 170**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC. Due to his unresponsiveness, the ARB was unable to confirm the EC's understanding of the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6):

ISN 170  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 8



(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the

following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 170  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 3 of 8

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 170  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 5 of 8



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material submitted on behalf of ISN 170 herein enclosed as Enclosure (4). There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 170.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *16 6/20/07*

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION  
ICO ISN 171 (YEMEN)

(b)(5)

o Subject ARB was held on 02 April 2007 and resulting in a unanimous recommendation

(b)(5) on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

(b)(5)

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) (Detain)

(b)(5) Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 171**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings and was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. The EC refused to hear the translation of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence and would not accept a copy – in keeping with the EC's past behavior with the ARB process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

(U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are

ISN 171  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8

included herein within enclosure (5).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1)



**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(1)





(b)(1)



e. **(U) Organizational Affiliations** The EC was affiliated with organizations espousing terrorism and violence against the United States and its allies.

(b)(1)



f. **(U) Individual Affiliations**

(b)(1)



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)

g. (U) **Behavior**

(b)(5)

h. (U) **Other Information**

(b)(1)

i. (U) **Factors in Support of** (b)(5)

(b)(1)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (U) (b)(2)

ISN 171  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 8

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

7. (U) **Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level**. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value**. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Detainee Treatment Act Consideration**. (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Recommendation**. (b)(5)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)



ISN 171  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 8 of 8

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *10/10/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 174 (TUNISIA)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 7 Aug 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5) (b)(5) (Transfer) \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(5) Detain \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_  
Attachments: *10-12*

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 174**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The EC refused to leave his cell for the interview. In accordance with Standard Operating Procedures, the Joint Detention Group (JDG) liaison hand-carried two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, to the JDG point of contact for delivery to the EC. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery to the EC from the JDG.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 174  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 9

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1)



(b)(1)

(i) (U) \* According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the TCG reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets U.S. and Western interests. Probably founded in 2000 by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah ben Hassine, the loosely organized group has come to be associated with al Qaeda and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots during the past two years. (DMO-4)

(b)(1)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(D)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



ISN 174  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 9

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)





(b)(5)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(1)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Tunisia. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:


(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)


d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.



**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3): 10 USC  
§ 130b, (b)(6)





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 175 (ALGERIA)**

- Subject ARB was held on 04 April 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 175**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) It was not necessary for the ARB to confirm that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview since the EC refused to leave his cell. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was translated and presented to the EC, via the Joint Detention Group point of contact for delivery to the EC.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6).

ISN 175  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 6



(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. No new exhibits were introduced since last year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) **Behavior**

(b)(5)

h. (U) **Other Information**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

i. (U) **Factors in Support of**

(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Algeria. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)



7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3): 10 USC  
§130b, (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *185/20/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 178 (YEMEN)**

(b)(5)

o Subject ARB was held on 26 March 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

	(b)(5)
DASD-DA	
CIA	
FBI	

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

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**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 178**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC. The AMO reported that the EC stared at the floor and would not give a response when asked if he understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

ISN 178  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)



(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. No new exhibits were introduced since last year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b)(7)(D)



(b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

ISN 178  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 8

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 178  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 8



(b)(1)

**g. (U) Behavior**

(b)(5)

**h. (U) Other Information**

(b)(1)

**i. (U) Factors in Support of**

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

- d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation (b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

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**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *8/16/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 179 (SAUDI ARABIA)**

o Subject ARB was held on 03 May 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Transfer)

(b)(5)

Detain \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 179**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC appeared to understand the process. The AMO noted the EC was cooperative, but the EC argued the unclassified summary has not changed since his first board and he saw no reason to attend.

(b)(1)



f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.



3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



b. (U) Travel The Board noted the EC followed a typical route for jihadists traveling from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan.

(b)(7)(A)

c. (U) Training The Board noted there is no available information on the EC's training.

(b)(7)(A)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 179  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 8



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Saudi Arabia. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(5)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

[Redacted]

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3), 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

[Redacted]



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

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**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *AS 4/10/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 189 (LIBYA)**

- Subject ARB was held on 19 September 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 189**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview. This statement is documented in Exhibit EC-B. A copy of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, was provided to the EC according to Joint Detention Group Standard Operating Procedures.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

ISN 189  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 7

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

a. (U) Recruitment

(1) (U) The Board notes there was no substantive or collaborative information on recruitment regarding this EC.

b. (U) Travel

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

c. (U) Training

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)





(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1), (b)(7)(D)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Libya. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation

(b)(5)



**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3) 10 USC §130b.(b)(6)





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

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**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC 18<sup>12</sup>/6/07

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 190 (EGYPT)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 12 October 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 190**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The EC requested the AMO read the Unclassified Summary from the 2006 ARB in its entirety to the board along with the EC's responses from 2006. The EC also requested the AMO present a written statement on his behalf. The AMO presented the Unclassified Summary from 2006 as Exhibit EC-C and the EC's written statement as Exhibit EC-D. Exhibits EC-C and EC-D are identified herein as enclosure (4).

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.
- b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (7).

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

ISN 190  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 2 of 7

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(7)(A)



**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**e. (U) Organizational Affiliations**

(b)(5)





f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Egypt. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material submitted on behalf of ISN 190, identified herein as enclosure (5). There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 190.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level**. The EC poses (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value**. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- c. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Detainee Treatment Act Consideration**. (b)(5)

(b)(1)



d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation


(b)(5)



**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC *15/12/08*

**SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 195 (Saudi Arabia)**

- Subject ARB was held on 11 Jan 08 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors: PROSECUTION)

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Detain)

(b)(5) Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

**Attachments:**

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 195**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive and refused to attend the interview. The Joint Detention Group (JDG) liaison hand-carried two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, to the JDG point of contact for delivery to the EC. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery to the EC from the JDG).

(b)(1)

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1)



ISN 195  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 3 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 195  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 4 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 195  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 5 of 11

(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 195  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 7 of 11



(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)





(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Saudi Arabia. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material submitted on behalf of ISN 195, identified herein as enclosure (4). There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 195.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)



**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

ISN 195  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 9 of 11

(b)(1)



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)



(b)(1)



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b, (b)(6)

ISN 195  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 11 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *12/26/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 197 (MOROCCO)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 19 November 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to  
(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	(b)(5)
FBI	(b)(5)

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 197**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 197  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 10

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 197**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 197  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 10

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1)

(b)(5)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1)

**c. (U) Training**

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(D)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 197  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 4 of 10

(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(D)



(b)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

(i) (U) \* The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported the LIFG emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. DHS further reported that the LIFG declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. DHS assessed that some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization or are active in the international Mujahedin

ISN 197  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 6 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

network. DHS reported the group was designated for asset freeze under E.O.13224 and UNSCR 1333 in September 2001. (DMO-3)

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

(b) (U) \* DHS reported Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded HIG as a faction of the Hezb-e-Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. DHS indicated HIG has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. DHS assessed that in the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. DHS further reported Hikmatyar offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996. (DMO-3)

ISN 197  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 7 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(5)

(a) (U) \* DHS reported the GSPC, an outgrowth of the Armed Islamic Group, is currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. DHS further reported that the GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although sometimes civilians are killed. DHS stated according to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe maintain contacts with other North African extremists sympathetic to al Qaida and in 2002, Algerian authorities killed a Yemeni al Qaida operative who met with a GSPC member. (DMO-3)

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Morocco. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(5)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

## 8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b; (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

**FOR:** Designated Civilian Official

**FROM:** Director, OARDEC *B2/1/08*

**SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 200 (SAUDI ARABIA)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 15 Jan 08 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	(b)(5)
FBI	(b)(5)

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b) Detain *[Signature]* (b)(5)

Attachment: *3-4-08*

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 200**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC chose to attend, and consequently the Board convened with the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC wanted to appear personally in the ARB Proceedings and wanted the assistance of the AMO.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The EC answered a series of questions from the ARB, which included inquiries regarding his motivation to travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan, his weapons training, his future plans, his perception of U.S. forces, and his treatment at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. All EC testimony and comments are included in enclosure (4).

(b)(1)

g. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

h. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (7):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for EC Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(i) (U) \* A Pakistani website (Paktribune) reported Jamat-al-Tabligh has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of religious activities. The organization is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and al Qaida. (DMO-17)

ISN 200  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 3 of 12

(b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(7)(A)



(b)(5)



(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(7)(A)





~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 200  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 5 of 12

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 200  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 6 of 12

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(5)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



(a) (U) In his ARB on 15 Jan 2008, the EC stated he knew Saeed al Ghamdi and Alnami but denied he knew Ahmed al Ghamdi. (Enclosure 4, pg. 18-19)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(a) (U) \* DHS reported the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, aka al Jihad, is an Egyptian Islamic extremist group that is designated as a foreign terrorist organization. The primary goals of al Jihad are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state, and to attack American and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad. DHS reported Al Jihad merged with al Qaida in June 2001. (DMO-2)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

(b)(5)



(b)(5)



**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Saudi Arabia. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material presented on behalf of ISN 200, herein enclosed as Enclosure (5), Exhibit EC-D. There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 200.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)



**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level.** The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value.** The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



ISN 200  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 10 of 12

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1)

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. ISN 200

(b)(5)

for the

following reasons:

(b)(1)

ISN 200  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 11 of 12

(b)(1)



**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC 18/4/30/07

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN202 (YEMEN)**

o Subject ARB was held on 21 February 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5)

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

	(b)(5)
DASD-DA	
CIA	
FBI	

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 202**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC refused to attend the interview.

d. (U) The AMO confirmed that the EC received two copies of the unclassified summary, one in Arabic and one in English.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.



**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. Of note, none of the agency and command assessments changed from last year. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) No new exhibits were introduced since year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(7)(A)




d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

**h. (U) Other Information**

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5)

**i. (U) Factors in Support of**

(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U)

(b)(2)



7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. (b)(5)

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) because:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *K/10/5/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 213 (KUWAIT)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 20 Jul 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 213**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview. This statement is documented in Exhibit EC-B.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC appeared to understand the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 213  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 6

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(7)(A)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

(a) (U) Al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia is on the United States Government's Terrorist Exclusion List as an organization supporting terrorist activity. (DMO-4)

(b)(1)

ISN 213  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 3 of 6



(b)(1)

c. (U) Training

(1) (U) The Board was not presented with any information that the EC had weapons or military training.

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

ISN 213  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 4 of 6

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

5. (U) **Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Kuwait. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material submitted on behalf of ISN 213, identified herein as enclosure (4). There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 213.

6. (U) **Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) **Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of

(b)(5)

due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

## 8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3), 10 USC §1306, (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *16 9/9/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 222 (AFGHANISTAN)**

- o Subject ARB was held on 10 May 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

- o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Transfer)

(b)(5)

Detain

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 222**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC chose to attend, and consequently the Board convened with the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC wanted to appear personally in the ARB Proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The EC responded to each factor presented in the Unclassified Summary and answered a series of questions from the ARB, which included inquiries regarding his motivation to support jihad, his weapons training, his future plans, and his perception of America. All EC testimony and comments are included in enclosure (5).

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

ISN 222  
Enclosure (6)  
Page 1 of 8



**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (7).

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(1) (U) \* During the ARB proceeding, the EC admitted he went to Afghanistan for training and jihad, and he hoped to go to Chechnya or Kashmir. (Enclosure 5, p. 3)

(a) (U) \* The EC said he saw in movies and on television how the Russians were oppressing the females [in Chechnya] and he wanted to go there to help.  
(Enclosure 5, p. 13)

(b)(1)

**b. (U) Travel**

(1) (U) \* The EC claimed in the ARB proceeding that he went to Afghanistan circa January 2001, and again about three months before 11 September 2001. The EC said he returned to Saudi Arabia after the first trip. (Enclosure 5, p. 3)

(b)(7)(A)

(i) (U) \* The EC denied this allegation during the ARB proceeding and said a passport computer check would verify when he went to Afghanistan.  
(Enclosure 5, p. 5)

(b)(7)(A)

(2) (U) During the ARB, the EC confirmed his previous statements about his travel route to Afghanistan – from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to Bahrain, then Doha, Qatar, and on to Karachi, Pakistan. The EC said it was a normal route from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan. (Enclosure 5, p. 3)

(a) (U) \* During the ARB, the EC confirmed he used the same route for both trips, traveling alone both times. The EC declined to say anything about who helped with his travel. (Enclosure 5, pp. 2, 6)

(b)(7)(A)

c. (U) Training

(1) (U) \* The EC admitted in the ARB that he trained at al Farouq camp, despite earlier claims that he never trained in Afghanistan. (Enclosure 5, p. 5)

(b)(1)

(b) (U) \* The EC admitted in the ARB proceeding that he learned to use mortars at al Farouq, but denied he was an expert. (Enclosure 5, pp. 5-6)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(1) (U) \* The EC admitted during the ARB proceeding that he was on the frontlines near Bagram, Afghanistan, fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. (Enclosure 5, p. 4)

(a) (U) \* When asked if he was in combat, the EC said there was little combat, mostly bombings [from the air] until he was defending against the Northern Alliance at Tora Bora. (Enclosure 5, p. 4)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(D)

(i) (U) \* The EC denied this in the ARB proceeding and said he was just a normal person. (Enclosure 5, p. 5)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

(3) (U) \* The EC admitted in the ARB that after about a month in the mountains he retreated from Tora Bora with other fighters for the Pakistani border. He said he kept his weapon while others discarded theirs. (Enclosure 5, p. 5)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

**e. (U) Organizational Affiliations**

(1) (U) \* The EC admitted in the ARB proceeding that he fought with the Taliban, but denied being part of al Qaida. (Enclosure 5, p. 3)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

(b) (U) \* The EC reiterated his claim that the numbers found on him at capture were of family and friends from his town and they were not al Qaida. (Enclosure 5, p. 8)


ISN 222

Enclosure (6)

Page 5 of 8


f.(U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)




g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)




(b)(7)(A)



(a) (U) \* The EC said in the ARB proceedings that he did not make these threats and did not know where this information was coming from. He said in the past there were problems in the camp, but these things happen in any camp. (Enclosure 5, p. 7)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)



(4) (U) \* The EC told the Board his relatives moved to Afghanistan from Uzbekistan about 80 years ago [during the Russian revolution] and his family years later moved to Saudi Arabia where he grew up. All the EC's immediate family is in Saudi Arabia, but he still has tribal ties in Afghanistan, according to the EC. The EC said his family has no ties to Uzbekistan. (Enclosure 5, p. 11)



(b)(5)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(7)(A)

(2) (U) \* The EC told the Board he would like to return home, get a job, get married, and relax – maybe get an education. He would not take up arms except in self defense. He would like to go back to Medina, where his family lives. (Enclosure 5, p. 10)

(3) (U) \* When the Board asked the EC if he ever met Usama bin Laden, the EC declined to answer. The EC said he did not look up to bin Laden and did not agree with everything he stood for, such as killing women and children. (Enclosure 5, pp. 9-10)

(4) (U) \* The EC said he wanted to go to Chechnya or Kashmir in 2001 to help the women and children. (Enclosure 5, p. 13)

5. (U) **Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Afghanistan. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) **Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) **Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level.** The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value.** The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1)

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *AS 19/30/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 223 (YEMEN)**

- Subject ARB was held on 13 Sep 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5) (Detain)

(b)(5) Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 223**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6):

ISN 223  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 8

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 223  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 5 of 8

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)





**h. (U) Other Information**

(b)(1)

**i. (U) Factors in Support of**

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material presented on behalf of ISN 223, herein enclosed as Enclosure (4). There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 223.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. (b)(5)

(b)(1)



(b)(5)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

## 8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *AS 4/13/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 224 (YEMEN)**

o Subject ARB was held on 28 March 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation (b)(5)

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Trans for)

(b)(5)

Detain

Release

Attachments: *1-30-07*

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 224**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview. Those comments are documented in EC-B.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 224  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 9

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 224  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 3 of 9



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 224  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 10

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



ISN 224  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 7 of 10

(b)(1), (b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1)





5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

- a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

- c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

- d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *JS 4/22/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 232 (KUWAIT)**

o Subject ARB was held on 14 March 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

*JS*  
*6-1-07*

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 232**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings, was uncooperative or unresponsive and refused to attend the interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that, in accordance with Standard Operating Procedures, the Joint Detention Group (JDG) liaison hand-carried two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, to the JDG point of contact for delivery to the EC. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery to the detainee from the JDG.

(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. No new exhibits were introduced since last year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(7)(A)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 232  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 9

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



ISN 232  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 9



(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)



(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Kuwait. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC (b)(5) to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3): 10 USC  
§130b, (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *2 9/19/09*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 233 (YEMEN)**

- Subject ARB was held on 26 April 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to [REDACTED] based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

[REDACTED]

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

[REDACTED]

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

[REDACTED]

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Detain) *[Signature] 9-17*

[REDACTED] Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR  
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 233

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview, and provided an oral statement made by the EC to the AMO during the interview. This statement is documented in Exhibit EC-B.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

ISN 233  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 10

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(3) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(5) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)



(6) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**2. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB.

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(1)

c. (U) Training

(1) (U) The board noted that in no DMO exhibit did the EC acknowledge training or being at al Farouq, a complex of al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan.

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 233  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 10

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)





~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 233  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(1)



ISN 233  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 7 of 10

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**3. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**4. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (U) (b)(2)

**5. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

**6. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *16/12/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 235 (YEMEN)**

o Subject ARB was held on 30 August 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the **ARB's** determination of this **EC's** case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 235**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview. This statement is documented in Exhibit EC-B.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 235  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 7



b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

4. (U) **Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

a. (U) **Recruitment**

(b)(1)



b. (U) **Travel**

(b)(1)



c. (U) **Training**

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC

(b)(5)

due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC

(b)(5)

due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

## 8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *18/9/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 238 (ALGERIA)**

- Subject ARB was held on 12 June 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Transfer with conditions)

(b)(5)

Detain \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 238**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC appeared to understand the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

ISN 238  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 7

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. No new exhibits were introduced since last year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(7)(A)





c. (U) Training

(b)(7)(A)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Algeria. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level.** The EC poses (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value.** The EC is (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- c. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

- d. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Recommendation.**

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *18/9/29/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 240 (YEMEN)**

○ Subject ARB was held on 31 January 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation (b)(5)

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

○ Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

○ Agency assessments follow:

(b)(5)

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

○ The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 240**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to personally appear in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview and verbally provided the EC's responses to the Unclassified Summary of Information. This is documented in Exhibit EC-B.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceeding was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 1 and ARB 2 packages.

ISN 240  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(1)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 240  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 8

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)





h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

5. (U) **Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) **Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) **Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

ISN 240  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 8

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level**. The EC poses (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value**. The EC is (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- c. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Detainee Treatment Act Consideration**.

(b)(1)

~~SECRET // NOFORN~~

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3), 10 USC §1306, (b)(6)

ISN 240  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 8 of 8

~~SECRET // NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *18/34/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 242 (YEMEN)**

- Subject ARB was held on 15 Aug 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation (b)(5) (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)
- 
- 
- 

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Detain

(b)(5) Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 242**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.



3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(7)(A)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)





(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is

(b)(5)

to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

## 8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *JS 1/9/08*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 244 (MOROCCO)**

- Subject ARB was held on 5 December 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 244**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. According to Exhibit EC-B, the EC was rude and impatient throughout the interview. A copy of both the English and Arabic translated Unclassified Summary of Evidence was provided to the EC who refused to accept either copy.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC appeared to understand the process.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(5)



ISN 244  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 3 of 11

(b)(7)(A)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 244  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 11



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 244  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)





(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)



(a) (U) Al Jama Al Islami Al Mugatila is an alias for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. (DMO-2)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)



5. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)



(b)(7)(A)



**6. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. The EC is a citizen of Morocco. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**7. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)



**8. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**


- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses  due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of  due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. 

 (b)(5)

(b)(5)



(b)(1)




d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. 

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

**9. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



ISN 244  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 11 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *8/9/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 249 (YEMEN)**

o Subject ARB was held on 06 Jun 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Transfer) \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(5)

Detain

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 249**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The AMO informed the ARB that the EC refused to leave his cell for his interview. The ARB confirmed a translated copy in the EC's language of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was delivered to the EC.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB.

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(1)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1)



ISN 249  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 7

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)



(b)(1)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U)

(b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(5)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of [REDACTED] due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(1) (U) (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC 15/1/07

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 252 (YEMEN)**

o Subject ARB was held on 06 Aug 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

(b)(5)

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 252**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC initially chose to attend the Board but ultimately declined to attend on the day of the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC wanted to appear personally in the ARB proceedings, would dictate a statement to the translator for the record and would speak directly to the board. Because the EC refused to leave his cell on the day of the board, the board was held in absentia and the AMO verbally provided the EC's responses to each allegation/statement in the Unclassified Summary. The AMO further presented correspondence from the EC as exhibit EC-C, identified herein as enclosure (4).

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 252  
Enclosure (7)  
Page 1 of 9

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (8):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



(b)(5)

(8) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(5)

**4 (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB):

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(A)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

c. (U) Training

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(A)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)

(a) (U) According the Department of Homeland Defense, al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia was placed on the terrorist exclusion list by the U.S. Secretary of State in consultation with the Attorney General of the U.S. Such designation signifies that the organization: commits or incites to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; prepares or plans a terrorist activity; gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or provides material support to further terrorist activity. (DMO-4)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

**h. (U) Other Information**

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(6)

(b)(1)

**i. (U) Factors in Support of**

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(6)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material submitted on behalf of ISN 252, herein enclosed as Enclosure (5).

ISN 252  
Enclosure (7)  
Page 7 of 9



6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is (b)(5) to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *1510/1/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 254 (YEMEN)**

(b)(5)

o Subject ARB was held on 1 Aug 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

*[Signature]*  
*10-12*

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 254**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

ISN 254  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITE)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



f. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



ISN 254  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 8



(b)(5)



g. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

(b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- c. ~~(S//NF)~~ EC Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

- d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3): 10 USC  
§130b, (b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *156/16/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 255 (YEMEN)**

- Subject ARB was held on 22 March 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5) (Transfer) \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Detain *[Signature]* Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment *1-30*

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 255**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The AMO reported the EC stated some of the things in the summary of evidence were true and some were not, and the EC did not feel his presence would make a difference during the Board. All EC testimony and comments are included in enclosure (4).

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 255  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the

ISN 255  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 2 of 8

following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(7)(A)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(7)(A)





(b)(7)(A)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



**d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture**

(b)(7)(A)



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 255  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 8

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

ISN 255  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 7 of 8

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is of (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *JS 2/01/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 256 (YEMEN)**

- Subject ARB was held on 30 January 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value: (b)(5)
- Other Factors: (b)(5)

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) (Detain)

(b)(5) Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 256**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to personally appear in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

(b)(5)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this EC, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this EC was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this EC.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.
- b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(7)(A)





(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 256  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 9

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level**. The EC poses (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value**. The EC is of (b)(5) due to his knowledge of the following:

(b)(1)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

ISN 256  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 9 of 9

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *10/12/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 257 (TAJIKISTAN)**

o Subject ARB was held on 25 October 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 257**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and the EC appeared to understand the process. The ARB confirmed two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, were delivered to the Joint Detention Group (JDG) point of contact for delivery to the EC. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery to the EC from the JDG.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 257  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 11

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" denotes information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(U) The Board notes there was no substantive or collaborative information on recruitment regarding this EC.

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)





(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

(a) (U) \* DHS reported the IMU, is a coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states opposed to Uzbekistani President Islom Karimov's secular regime. Although the primary goal remains to overthrow Karimov and establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, IMU political and ideological leader Tohir Yoldashev is working to rebuild the organization and it appears to have widened the IMU's targets to include all those he perceives as fighting Islam. DHS reported the IMU generally has been unable to operate in Uzbekistan and thus has been more active in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. (DMO-4)

(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 257  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 8 of 11

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The board noted there is a question concerning the EC's citizenship. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



(b)(1)




c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



(b)(5)



d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)




(b)(5)



**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *8/4/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 258 (SAUDI ARABIA)**

(b)(5)

o Subject ARB was held on 04 May 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 258**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the EC made during the AMO's interview, and provided an oral statement made by the EC to the AMO during the interview. This statement is documented in Exhibit EC-B.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 258  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 7

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)



**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC.

An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b)(5)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)



ISN 258  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 5 of 7

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Saudi Arabia. No third party or home country statements were provided.



6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

(U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC pose (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)

ISN 258  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 7 of 7





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *18 8/25/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 259 (YEMEN)**

o Subject ARB was held on 09 April 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation

(b)(5)

(b)(5) based on the following:

o

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-	(b)(5)
DA	
CIA	
FBI	

- o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation
- o (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO,

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Detain \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 259**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive and refused to attend the interview. This behavior is documented in Exhibit EC-B.

d. (U) The Joint Detention Group (JDG) liaison hand carried the Unclassified Summary of Evidence to the JDG point of contact for delivery to the EC. The AMO received written confirmation of delivery.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

ISN 259  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 8

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

- a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.
- b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5).

**(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)**

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

**(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)**

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB.

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1)



ISN 259  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 3 of 8

(b)(1)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 259  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 8



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 259  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 8

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(1), (b)(5)

h. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(A)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Yemen. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

- a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is assessed (b)(5)

ISN 259  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 7 of 8

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation

(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

ISN 259  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 8 of 8

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 263 (LIBYA)**

o Subject ARB was held on 13 June 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)  
(b)(5)  
(Detain)

(b)(5) Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC DSJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 263**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC. The EC remained unresponsive.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (7).

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" in the following text annotates information from exhibits not used in the previous year's ARB.

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(1)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(1)

5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Libya. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material submitted on behalf of ISN 263, identified herein as enclosure (4). There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 263.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



(b)(1)

[Redacted]

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is

(b)(5)

due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

[Redacted]

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

## 8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3): 10 USC  
§ 130b, (b)(6)

[Redacted]



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *AS 4/16/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 268 (SAUDI ARABIA)**

(b)(5)

o Subject ARB was held on 22 March 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 268**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC refused to attend the interview. The ARB confirmed the EC received two copies of the unclassified summary, English and Arabic translated in accordance with Joint Detention Group standard operating procedures.

(b)(1)

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

ISN 268  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 9

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

ISN 268  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 2 of 9

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 268  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 3 of 9



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(5)



ISN 268  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 9



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



(b)(1), (b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)



ISN 268  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 7 of 9

(b)(1)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1)

5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Saudi Arabia. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

- a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC poses a (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration (b)(5)

[Redacted]

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

[Redacted]

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)

[Redacted]



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *B. 10/2/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 269 (CHAD)**

○ Subject ARB was held on 7 Aug 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

○ Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

○ Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

○ The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 269**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Joint Detention Group (JDG) liaison hand-carried two copies of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, to the JDG point of contact for delivery to the EC, in accordance with Standard Operating Procedures.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6).

ISN 269  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 9

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB.

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(7)(A)



(b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b)(1)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



ISN 269  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 5 of 9

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(1), (b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1)

5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Chad. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC 5/2/07

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 288 (ALGERIA)**

○ Subject ARB was held on 2 April 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5)

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

○ Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

○ Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA

CIA

FBI

(b)(5)

○ The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO,

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Transfer)

(b)(5)

Detain \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 288**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed that a translator who spoke the same language as the EC was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the EC, and that the EC understood the process.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6):

ISN 288  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 7

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(8) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN 288  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 3 of 7



(b)(1)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1)

e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

i. (U) Factors in Support of

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Algeria. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material submitted on behalf of ISN 288, herein enclosed as Enclosure (4), Exhibit EC-C. There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 288.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration. (b)(5)  
(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. (b)(5)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)

ISN 288  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 7 of 7

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *10/16/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 307 (SYRIA)**

- Subject ARB was held on 2 July 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: (b)(5)
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

- (b)(1)

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA
CIA
FBI

(b)(5)

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b) Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 307**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, English and Arabic translated, was delivered to the Joint Detention Group liaison for delivery to the EC. The AMO received written confirmation of the delivery to the EC from the Joint Detention Group.

(b)(1)

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

ISN 307  
Enclosure (5)  
Page 1 of 9

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (6):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

**a. (U) Recruitment**

(b)(1)

**b. (U) Travel**

(b)(7)(A)

**c. (U) Training**

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)





(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



(b)(1)

h. (U) Other Information

(b)(1)

i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1)

5. (U) **Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Syria. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) **Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is (b)(5) to the following factors:

(b)(1)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation

(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *15/8/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 309 (UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)**

○ Subject ARB was held on 24 May 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to

(b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

○ Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

○ Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

○ The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(Detain)

(b)(5)

Transfer

Release

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 309**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence both English and Arabic versions were delivered to the Joint Detention Group (JDG) liaison for delivery to the EC in accordance with standard operating procedures.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

ISN 309  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 9

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

**4. (U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the

following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1)

b. (U) Travel

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)

c. (U) Training

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 309  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 4 of 9



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 309  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 9

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



(b)(1)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



ISN 309  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 6 of 9

g. (U) Behavior

(b)(1), (b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)



i. (U) Factors in Support of (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of the United Arab Emirates. No third party or home country statements were provided.

6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor

- a. (U) (b)(2)

7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ Threat Level. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The EC is (b)(5) to the following factors:

(b)(1)

- c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

- d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation.

(b)(5)

**8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results**

- a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 USC  
§130b,(b)(6)



**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *18 8/28/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 310 (ALGERIA)**

- Subject ARB was held on 30 May 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

(b)(5)

- Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

- Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

- The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) (Transfer) \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(5) Detain *[Signature]* Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments: *8-29*

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review

Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 310**

**1. (U) Introduction**

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

**2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings**

a. (U) The EC declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the EC present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the EC was uncooperative or unresponsive.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, both English and Arabic translated copies, were delivered to the Joint Detention Group liaison for delivery to the EC.

e. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and then closed the session for deliberation.

f. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

**3. (U) Summary of Information Considered**

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 2 package.

b. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included herein within enclosure (5):

ISN 310  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 1 of 7

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)



(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



ISN 310  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 2 of 7

(b)(1),(b)(5)



**4.(U) Primary Factors (Including Intelligence Value and Law Enforcement Value of the Enemy Combatant)**

(U) The ARB considered the above agency and command assessments and the following key indicators in the ARB's threat and intelligence assessment of the EC. An "\*" is used in the following text to annotate information derived from exhibits not utilized in the previous year's ARB:

a. (U) Recruitment

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



b. (U) Travel

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



c. (U) Training

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



d. (U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)





(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)



e. (U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)



f. (U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(1)



g. (U) Behavior

(b)(5)



h. (U) Other Information

(b)(7)(A)



ISN 310  
Enclosure (4)  
Page 5 of 7



(b)(7)(A)



i. **(U) Factors in Support of** (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



**5. (U) Third Party / Home Country Statements**

- a. (U) The EC is a citizen of Algeria. No third party or home country statements were provided.

**6. (U) Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)



**7. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**

- a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Threat Level**. The EC (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Intelligence Value.** The EC is (b)(5) due to the following factors:

(b)(1)



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Recommendation.**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

## 8. (U) Board Members' Voting Results

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3); 10 USC §130b; (b)(6)





**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review**  
**of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)**  
**at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
**ACTION MEMO**

FOR: Designated Civilian Official

FROM: Director, OARDEC *156/21/07*

SUBJECT: **ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**ICO ISN 311 (ALGERIA)**

o Subject ARB was held on 29 March 2007 resulting in a unanimous recommendation to (b)(5) based on the following:

- Threat Assessment:
- Intelligence Value:
- Other Factors:

o Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:

(b)(1)

o Agency assessments follow:

DASD-DA	(b)(5)
CIA	
FBI	

o The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO

(b)(5)

(b)(5) (Detain) \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(5) Transfer \_\_\_\_\_ Release \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review  
Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~